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Abstract: Innovative engineering design always has associated with it the risk of failure, and it is the role 
of the design engineer to mitigate the possibilities of failure in the final system. Education should 
however provide a safe space for students to both innovate and to learn about and from failures. 
However, pressures on course designers and students can result in their adopting a conservative, and risk 
averse, approach to problem solving. The paper therefore considers the nature of both innovation and 
failure, and looks at how these might be effectively combined within mechatronics design education. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
‘Creative breakthroughs always begin with multiple failures’ 
James Dyson1 
The design of all engineering artefacts and systems is 
essentially a goal driven problem solving exercise in which 
the aim is to satisfy user requirements through the appropriate 
use of available technologies and materials while taking 
account of applied constraints. Throughout the history of 
engineering, this combination of challenges in which the 
designer seeks to optimise outcomes within the available 
solution space has driven a search for innovative and creative 
solutions. However, in this search for innovation, some 
solutions that come under consideration must inevitably fail 
to provide the desired outcomes [1,2]. Notwithstanding such 
failures, these solutions often contain within them 
information essential to driving forward understanding, 
which is then embedded into future solutions. In this context, 
it is therefore important that failures are not simply discarded, 
but are subject to rigorous analysis and evaluation so that the 
embedded knowledge is transferred to other engineers and 
other projects. Creating an effective engineering design 
curriculum that expects its graduates to be innovative 
designers who learn from failure requires the course 
designers and the delivery team to overcome a range of 
challenges, not the least of which are external pressures such 
as those imposed by quality reviews. 
It is also necessary to recognise that within the context of the 
paper the use of the term ‘failure’ does not automatically 
imply or suggest negativity, either from the perspective of the 
instructor or the student. Rather, it is used to express a 
universal feature of the engineering design process which if 
treated correctly, has major and significant educational 
benefits [3,4,5]. 
The authors therefore argue that engineering students should 
be encouraged towards attempting innovative, and hence 
risky, solutions, even though some may ultimately fail to 
meet desired criteria. This then implies that the imposition of 
inherently artificial constraints, as for instance such as might 
be associated with grading and marking, does not result in 
students adopting an inherently conservative approach to 
                                                                  
1  In reviewing Syed M, Black Box Thinking, John Murray, 2015 
engineering design problem solving. 
The paper thus begins by considering the nature of innovation 
and its links to the design process before looking at the nature 
of failure within design, development and implementation, 
including an examination of different types of failure as 
exemplars influencing engineering design learning. Having 
established the background, approaches to encouraging 
innovation are considered in terms of their implication for 
both the student and the course designers. Issues such as 
communication and interaction within the design innovation 
process are considered, including how such communication 
can be supported by appropriate technologies and techniques. 
It is recognised that an approach to assessment within a 
framework where it is acknowledged that some designs will 
fail will, in some cases, require a shift away from current 
processes of evaluation, marking and grading. 
The paper concludes by looking at models for engineering 
design courses in which design innovation, and hence risk 
taking, are encouraged, and considers how such courses 
could be assessed. 
2. THE NATURE OF INNOVATION 
The first challenge when considering innovation is that of 
understanding innovation itself. Dictionary definitions are 
typically structured along the lines of: 
1) The action or process of innovating 
 1.1) A new method, idea, product, etc. 
Other definitions range from the simple and straightforward 
such as: 
Innovation is significant positive change [6] 
to the more complex: 
Innovation is the multi-stage process whereby organizations 
transform ideas into new/improved products, service or 
processes, in order to advance, compete and differentiate 
themselves successfully in their marketplace. [7] 
Innovation is production or adoption, assimilation, and 
exploitation of a value-added novelty in economic and social 
spheres; renewal and enlargement of products, services, and 
markets; development of new methods of production; and 
establishment of new management systems. It is both a process 
 
 
 
and an outcome. [8] 
The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) meanwhile provides 4 different 
definitions dependent on context [9]: 
Product Innovation - A good or service that is new or 
significantly improved. This includes significant 
improvements in technical specifications, components and 
materials, software in the product, user friendliness or other 
functional characteristics. 
Process Innovation - A new or significantly improved 
production or delivery method. This includes significant 
changes in techniques, equipment and/or software. 
Marketing Innovation -  A new marketing method involving 
significant changes in product design or packaging, product 
placement, product promotion or pricing. 
Organisational Innovation - A new organisational method in 
business practices, workplace organisation or external 
relations. 
Indeed, surveys by Baregheh, Rowley & Sambrook [7], 
Crossan & Apaydin [8] and Edison et al [10] have suggested 
upwards of 40 definitions currently in use, many of which are 
situation dependent. 
In the context of the paper, with its focus on engineering 
design education, it is proposed to take the OECD definition 
of product innovation above as the underlying concept, while 
not neglecting other aspects, such as the multi-disciplinarily 
aspects embedded or implicit in the various definitions. 
2.1 Elements of Innovation 
The previous section established that innovation is a complex 
and multi-faceted process which involves consideration of 
markets and opportunities as well as technologies. It is 
necessary therefore to establish those contributory elements 
of the innovation process which determine its outcomes. 
Innovation through Evolution or ‘Standing on the Shoulders 
of Giants’ 2 
Innovations do not in general spring into life fully formed, 
they evolve incrementally over time through a process of 
experiment and evaluation, in which an understanding of the 
nature of failure plays an important part. Numerous examples 
of this process can be found in engineering applications 
where earlier developments, and failures, supported by 
developments in associated technologies, provide the basis 
for next generation systems [11]. 
For the course designer, this implies a need to establish a 
sound technical base. 
Communication & Networking or ‘The Water-Cooler 
Moment’ 
The cross-fertilisation of ideas is crucial to innovation, and 
often comes from apparently random discussions resulting 
from informal interactions in environments with very low 
cultural barriers to communication [12]. To encourage such 
interaction, organisations have increasingly organised office 
space to force such interactions. For instance, Steve Jobs of 
                                                                  
2  By Isaac Newton in a 1676 letter to Robert Hooke but its use as a 
metaphor extends back before that. 
Apple & Pixar argued that: 
“If a building doesn’t encourage [collaboration], you’ll lose a 
lot of innovation and the magic that’s sparked by 
serendipity. So we designed the building to make people get 
out of their offices and mingle in the central atrium with 
people they might not otherwise see.” [13] 
and at Pixar redesigned the workspace, which had originally 
provided separate buildings for computer scientists, 
animators, and everyone else as a campus where random 
encounters would take place. The design focused on an 
atrium that Jobs intended to house the only restrooms on 
campus to force people into a space where they would 
encounter others! 
For the course designer, this implies a need to support 
individuals in developing personal, along with presentational, 
communication skills, which of course must include the 
ability to listen to others. 
Concept Development or ‘The Idea’ 
The nature of innovation in the modern era is such that the 
idea of the solitary inventor emerging with a fully formed 
product or system probably no longer exists, if indeed it ever 
did in reality. This was recognised by Thomas Edison in his 
creation in 1876 of the research facility at Menlo Park. 
Though Edison was generally the person to whom the 
inventions that emerged were legally attributed3, in the main 
they resulted from the research staff working under his 
direction. 
The reality is that majority of innovations emerge over time 
as individuals gather information about need, requirements, 
problems, potential outcomes and solutions along with 
consideration of the target market, which itself is likely to 
impact on the nature of the final product or system. Thus, the 
Sony Walkman evolved not only out of its underlying 
technical considerations, but out of the belief and 
understanding that it could be used to create a new market, in 
this case for a portable music player [14]. 
For the course designer, this implies a need to support 
individuals in developing recording and note taking skills to 
put in place the structure of the innovation and to support the 
identification of the skills, tools and resources required for its 
implementation. 
Serendipity or ‘Recognising the Opportunity’ 
A key aspect of innovation is the ability to identify and 
develop concepts that have originated in other ways and from 
other areas and to recognise that they have a potential 
application in relation to the specific problem for which a 
solution is being sought. This implies an open-minded 
approach in which no concepts or ideas are rejected simply 
because they do not fit a pre-conceived model of a solution4. 
Perhaps the best known of example of a serendipitous 
innovation is that of the sticky or Post-it® note. In 1968, Dr 
Spencer Silver, a chemist working at 3M, developed a low 
adhesion adhesive that could be repositioned without leaving 
a mark5 but for which no application could, at the time, be 
                                                                  
3  Edison's name is carried by 1,093 patents. 
4  As might be expressed by the ‘not invented here’ mind-set. 
5  He was actually hoping to find a high-strength adhesive! 
 
 
 
found. A few years later, Art Fry, a colleague of Dr Silver's, 
and a member of a local church choir, was looking for a way 
to stop markers falling out of his hymnal and remembered 
this adhesive and tried some on his bookmarks. The rest, as 
they say, is history…!6 
For the course designer, this implies creating opportunities 
for the cross-fertilisation of ideas and exposing individuals to 
different means of thinking about, and solving, problems. 
Interdisciplinary Working or ‘The Other Technologies’  
Recent decades have seen an increasing integration in 
technologies at the system level through the introduction of 
concepts such as those of mechatronics, Cyber-Physical 
Systems (CPS) [15] and the Internet of Things (IoT) [16]. 
Such systems, which are often context dependent and 
dynamic in nature, are dependent not on a single technology 
but on a combination of technologies to support their 
operation. In consequence, the innovator needs to have access 
to support and expertise across the range of necessary 
technologies required for the final system. 
For instance, a modern vehicle system is structured around a 
series of individual mechatronic components such as engine 
& drive train management, traction control, driver assistance 
(lane control, smart cruise control, smart lighting, etc.) 
environmental controls and entertainment systems which are 
then integrated through software to create a Cyber-Physical 
System in the form of the vehicle itself. Finally, through 
communication at the level of the IoT the vehicle can support 
traffic management and routing as well as diagnostics and 
reporting, leading ultimately to self-driving vehicles. 
For a mechatronics course designer, this implies a need to 
create opportunities for group working and the development 
of systems level concepts applied across a range of 
technologies. 
Learning through Failure or ‘Things Break’ 
In engineering, failures occur on a reasonably regular basis, 
and are generally traceable to a specific cause or causes. The 
requirement therefore is that of being able to understand the 
nature of failure, and to mitigate against possible failures, 
throughout the design, development, construction and 
operational phases of the life cycle of a product or system. 
The ability to analyse failure and identify the underlying 
cause is therefore an important part of the innovation process. 
In this context therefore, consider the following: 
On the BBC Radio 4 programme ‘Learning from Life and 
Death’ broadcast on 9 July 2017, Dan Cobley of Blenheim 
Chalcot, and formerly CEO of Google UK, commented that 6-
year olds who immediately begin a sequence of play and 
experiment and proceed through a process of trial and error 
can often outperform MBA students in the spaghetti and 
marshmallow tower challenge as they repeatedly try and fail 
but observe, and learn from, their failures while the MBA 
students will often attempt to go directly to a final solution 
without intermediate trials, and hence have no evidential 
failures to learn from. 
                                                                  
6  3M, along with Google, IBM and others, allow employees time to work 
on their own projects. In the case of 3M, many of their major product 
developments came from this freedom to explore concepts and ideas. 
Experience or ‘Time on the Job’ 
In comparing the performance of expert (or experienced) and 
novice scientists Feist [17] noted that: 
1. Expert scientists are more willing to modify or discard 
hypotheses than novices. 
2. Experts demonstrate more cognitive complexity when 
they discuss their domain. 
3. Novices solve problems and evaluate evidence based on 
more common-sense representations; experts form 
abstract representations. 
4. Experts use chunking and mode-linked representations of 
large quantities of domain knowledge. 
5. Experts work forward from the information given; 
novices work backwards from a possible solution. 
6. Experts are more likely to discover useful analogies. 
This suggests that the behaviour of the expert is tempered by 
experience, including that of failure, and that a course 
designer needs to properly consider the underlying 
experience of their students. 
3. THE NATURE OF FAILURE 
To more fully understand the relationship between innovation 
and risk, the following exemplars serve to illustrate the range 
of different types and causes of failure. 
Communication Error – Mars Climate Orbiter 
Following the initiation of its orbital insertion manoeuvre in 
September 1999, the Mars Climate Orbiter lost radio 
connection as it passed behind Mars 49 seconds earlier than 
expected, and communication was never regained. It was 
established that the spacecraft was at a lower altitude than 
intended and broke up in the Martian atmosphere. The main 
underlying cause lay in a communication failure between two 
systems groups with the result that part of the software, 
supplied by Lockheed Martin, produced results for the 
thrusters in pound-seconds while the trajectory calculation 
software which used these results was expecting them to be 
expressed in newton-seconds. Discrepancies between 
calculated and measured positions had in fact been detected 
and reported, but were ignored [18]. 
Moral – Communication is key. 
Construction Error – Hyatt Regency walkway 
In July 1981, two suspended walkways collapsed into the 
lobby of the Hyatt Regency in Kansas City, killing 114 and 
injuring 216. It was established that problems in construction 
had resulted in a design change that significantly increased 
the load on the connections at the upper walkway. The new 
design was just capable of supporting the static load of the 
structure, but not the live load of the people using the 
walkway at the time of its collapse. 
As designed (Figs 1(a) & 1(b)), the walkways were 
suspended from steel tie rods, with the lower walkway 
directly under the upper walkway. The upper walkway was 
suspended from cross-beams in the ceiling by steel rods 
retained by nuts. Investigators later determined that this 
design only supported 60% of the minimum load required by 
local building codes. The contractor responsible for 
manufacturing the rods objected to the original design as it 
 
 
 
required the whole of the rod below the upper walkway to be 
threaded to screw on the nuts holding the upper walkway in 
place. An alternate was proposed (Figs 1(c) & 1(d)) using 
two sets of tie rods, one set connecting the upper walkway to 
the ceiling cross-beams, and the other set connecting the 
lower walkway to the upper walkway. 
In the original design, the connectors for the upper walkway 
were only required to carry the total load (live + static) of the 
upper walkway, with the total load of the lower walkway 
being entirely supported by the rods, the connectors for the 
lower walkway then carrying only the load of that walkway. 
However, in the revised design, the upper walkway 
connectors were now required to carry the total load of both 
the upper and lower walkways. The resulting redesign could 
now only carry 30% of the mandatory minimum load, 
resulting in the collapse of the walkways [19]. 
Moral – Design changes need to be checked and verified. 
 
 (a) Intended configuration           (b) Connection as designed 
 
 (c) Revised configuration           (d) Connection as built 
Load1 = 50% of total load on upper walkway 
Load2 = 50% of total load on upper walkway 
Fig. 1. Hyatt Regency walkway. 
Design Error – Space Shuttle Challenger 
The Space Shuttle Challenger broke apart shortly after 
launch from Cape Canaveral on 28 January 1986, resulting in 
the deaths of five astronauts and two Payload Specialists. The 
root cause of Challenger’s disintegration was the failure of an 
O-ring seal in the right solid rocket booster (SRB) shortly 
after lift-off. The O-ring was not designed to fly under the 
unusually cold conditions experienced prior to and at launch 
and its failure resulted in a loss of containment at the SRB 
joint. High-pressure burning gas was then released onto the 
SRB aft field joint attachment and the external fuel tank, 
causing a catastrophic failure after which aerodynamic forces 
resulted in the break-up of the shuttle. 
The original design of the SRB joints and the O-ring seal 
(Fig. 2) meant that on ignition of the SRBs, the joint would 
rotate, allowing gasses to bypass the primary O-ring and 
reach the secondary O-ring, where burning had been 
observed on previous launches. The Rogers Commission also 
found that NASA's own organizational culture and decision-
making processes had been contributing factors to the 
accident, and that the agency violating its own safety rules in 
permitting the launch to take place [20]. 
Moral – Never rely on assumptions where safety is concerned. 
 
Fig. 2. Original design of SRB joint. 
Human Error – Kegworth Air Crash 
In January 1989, a Boeing 737-400 operating as British 
Midland Flight 92 was en route from London Heathrow to 
Belfast when a fan-blade broke in the port engine. Smoke 
entered the flight-deck, leading the flight crew to assume that 
the problem was with the starboard engine as previous 737 
models had ventilated the flight-deck from the starboard 
engine. They were unaware that this was not the case with the 
-400 which took air from both engines. This was 
compounded by changes to the engine vibration gauges for 
which the flight crew had not yet been trained as there was no 
737-400 simulator in the UK. As a result, the flight crew shut 
down the starboard engine while increasing the power on the 
port engine, which burst into flames. Of 126 aboard, 47 died 
and 74 sustained serious injuries. 
The inquiry attributed the blade fracture to metal fatigue 
caused by heavy vibration in the upgraded engines, which 
had been tested on the ground but not under flight conditions, 
the latter not being mandatory at the time for an upgrade [21]. 
Moral – People make mistakes. 
Maintenance Error - Continental Express Flight 2574 
In September 1991, an Embraer EMB 120 Brasilia 
(Continental Express Flight 2574 operated by Britt Airways) 
was on route from Laredo International Airport to Bush 
Intercontinental Airport (IAH) in Houston when it crashed, 
killing all 14 people on board. The National Transportation 
Safety Board (NTSB) investigation discovered that the cause 
of the crash was some missing screws on the horizontal 
stabiliser. The screws had been removed when the aircraft 
was undergoing maintenance the night before the accident 
and, following a shift change, had not been replaced. 
NTSB report [22] noted that: 
“The failure of Continental Express maintenance and 
inspection personnel to adhere to proper maintenance and 
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quality assurance procedures for the airplane's horizontal 
stabilizer de-ice boots that led to the sudden in-flight loss of 
the partially secured left horizontal stabilizer leading edge 
and the immediate severe nose-down pitchover and breakup 
of the airplane. Contributing to the cause of the accident was 
the failure of the Continental Express management to ensure 
compliance with the approved maintenance procedures, and 
the failure of FAA surveillance to detect and verify 
compliance with approved procedures.” 
Moral – Procedures are there for a reason. 
Materials Failure – Purity Distilling Company 
The Boston Molasses Flood of 1919 occurred when a tank 
containing some 8.7 x 106 l of molasses collapsed, releasing 
an 8m wall of molasses travelling at over 50 kph, which 
killed 21 people and injuring around 150. The tank was 
poorly constructed and testing was inadequate and the initial 
failure probably occurred at a manhole cover when a fatigue 
crack reached criticality. A modern study established that the 
steel was deficient in manganese, making it more brittle, and 
was only half as thick required for the pressures involved 
[23]. 
Moral – Proper testing is vital. 
Operating Error – Three Mile Island 
The Three Mile Island accident of March 1979 was 
associated with failures in the non-nuclear secondary system 
and a stuck-open pilot-operated relief valve in the primary 
system, resulting in the escape of reactor coolant. The 
investigation revealed both human factors and user interface 
issues with the operator’s control panel. In the case of the 
relief valve, though this was stuck open, an indicator light on 
the control panel appeared to indicate that it was in fact 
closed. This came about because the indicator light did not 
indicate the actual position of the valve, only if the valve 
solenoid was powered. This led the operators to assume that 
the valve itself was closed. 
The situation was compounded by the operators not having 
been properly briefed on the ambiguous nature of the 
indicator and the need for additional confirmation of relief 
valve closure. There was in fact a downstream temperature 
gauge which would have shown the temperature in the tail 
pipe was higher than if the relief valve was shut. This was not 
however one of indicators intended to be used for this 
purpose, and the operators had not been trained to interpret it.  
Following a shift change in the control room, the temperature 
increase was noted and a backup used to shut off the coolant 
flow, but not before some 120,000 l of coolant had been 
released from the primary loop [24]. 
Moral – Avoid ambiguities. 
Software Error – F22A Raptor 
In February 2007 a flight of F-22A Raptors were deploying 
Hickam AFB in Hawaii to Kadena AFB in Japan. When the 
aircraft crossed the International Date Line (IDL), on-board 
computer systems crashed. When attempts to reboot the 
systems failed, the F-22s had to be led back to Hawaii by 
their escorting tanker aircraft. 
In an interview with CNN, retired Airforce Major General 
Don Sheppard stated that [25]: 
“… at the international date line, whoops, all systems 
dumped and when I say all systems, I mean all systems, their 
navigation, part of their communications, their fuel systems. 
They were — they could have been in real trouble. They were 
with their tankers. The tankers – they tried to reset their 
systems, couldn’t get them reset. The tankers brought them 
back to Hawaii. This could have been real serious. It 
certainly could have been real serious if the weather had 
been bad. It turned out OK. It was fixed in 48 hours. It was a 
computer glitch in the millions of lines of code, somebody 
made an error in a couple lines of the code and everything 
goes.” 
The problem was essentially instantaneous transition from 
179.9°W to 180°E on crossing the IDL, something which no-
one had thought about. 
Moral – Check, check and check again. 
Cascade Failure – 2006 European power outage 
A cascade or cascading failure occurs in an interconnected 
system when the failure of an individual node results in a 
failure in succession of other nodes as they attempt to 
compensate for the failed node. These nodes may then fail in 
turn, resulting in the collapse of the system. 
Such a collapse occurred in Europe in 2006 when more than 
15 million clients of the European Network of Transmission 
System Operators for Electricity lost supply for some two 
hours.  The cause of this blackout was the planned, and 
routine, disconnection of the Ems powerline crossing in 
north-west Germany for the passage of a ship. However, a 
change in timing was not passed on to all operators in time to 
enable a full system analysis of the change to be carried out. 
The result was that when the disconnect was implemented, 
the power on connected lines began to increase. It was 
thought that closing a tie would decrease the load on these 
lines. In fact, the opposite effect and lines began to trip out. 
Over some 28 seconds, the outage cascaded across Europe 
[26]. 
Moral – Expect the unexpected. 
As systems become increasingly self-organising, and hence 
more complex, as for instance in association with the 
development of Cyber-Physical Systems and the Internet of 
Things, the potential for such failures will inevitably 
increase. 
3.1 Innovation & Risk 
From the above it is clear that innovation generally implies 
operating at, or in some instances beyond, established 
boundaries, and that it carries with it an element of risk 
regarding outcomes. For this reason, within the engineering 
design, implementation and operating environments, tools 
such as Failure Mode, Criticality and Effect Analysis 
(FMECA) have been developed as a means of both 
identifying and dealing with risk [27]. 
Within the context of the paper, risk is essentially concerned 
with the decisions made at the level of the concept design to 
utilise solutions which attempt to take full advantage of 
available technologies. The alternative is a conservative 
approach relying on demonstrably proven options. 
 
 
 
4. ENGINEERING DESIGN ISSUES 
The engineering design process has been well documented 
and has resulted over time in the development of various 
design support tools which can be deployed to support the 
reduction of the initial solution space, containing all viable 
solutions, through the application of appropriate constraints 
to one which contains the chosen solution when relevant 
external factors are considered. 
4.1 Mechatronics, Cyber-Physical Systems & the Internet of 
Things 
Referring to Fig. 3, it is seen that mechatronics was a major 
driver of the 3rd industrial revolution. However, the 21st 
century and the growth of cloud-based systems such as the 
Internet of Things and Cyber-Physical Systems represent a 4th 
industrial revolution [28] presenting new challenges to the 
designers of mechatronic systems in areas such as privacy 
and security [29] as well as in the more conventional areas of 
integrating electronics with mechanical engineering. 
The mechatronics design engineer is now increasingly in a 
situation where they are responsible for smart components 
and sub-systems which will be integrated within a larger, and 
essentially unknown at the time of design, system which may 
well be capable of self-configuration depending on context, 
as is suggested in Fig. 4 for a vehicle system. Referring to 
this figure, the mechatronic elements constitute the bulk of 
the on-board systems. These then come under the control of 
the cyber element to create a CPS in the form of the vehicle. 
The IoT then provides the link between the individual and the 
wider world to support interactions between vehicles and 
systems such as those engaged in traffic management. Each 
of these systems has associated with it a potential for failure 
which must be accommodated, including issues such as 
privacy and machine ethics [30,31]. This suggests that any 
Mechatronic Design oriented course needs to consider: 
• Integration of the computation and physical processes. 
• Product life-cycle management. 
• Design methods. 
• Tools for modelling and simulation [32]. 
5. MECHATRONICS COURSE DESIGN 
For the mechatronics course designer, the above implies 
introducing the concepts of engineering design while 
providing access to the necessary tools along with an 
understanding of their use, operational implications and 
limitations. Specifically, there is a need to ensure that 
students are ultimately able to: 
• Manage the ambiguities that arise in the concept stages of 
design. These tend to be associated with the need to 
combine divergent thinking considering multiple potential 
outcomes, and fact-based convergent thinking. 
• Place ideas within the context of desired outcomes and 
the associated systems concepts and dynamics. This is 
particularly so where different teams are working on 
different aspects of the same problem. 
• Manage the uncertainties associated with the engineering 
design process that are associated with incomplete and 
imperfect models, incomplete information and potentially 
ambiguous objectives. 
• Estimate outcomes based on the identification of key 
design parameters. This is supported by statistical tools to 
assess the sensitivity of the design to variations in these 
key parameters, and is closely associated with 
experimental design and testing of prototypes. 
• Manage communications between the members of a 
design team. These can take a variety of forms including: 
+ Verbal (spoken) and written (textual) communication 
involving formalised syntactical forms of expression. 
+ Diagrams to provide a visual description and 
representation of design artefacts. 
+ Models representing specific behavioural aspects. 
+ Parametric or numerical data associated with discrete-
valued information. 
In context of the above, Froyd et al [33] identified the five 
major developments in engineering education over the 20th 
and early 21st centuries as: 
• A transition from hands-on and practical experience to 
engineering science and analysis. 
• A transition to outcomes-based education and 
accreditation. 
• An increasing emphasis on the role and contribution of 
engineering design. 
• The application of education, learning and social and 
behavioural sciences research. 
• The integration of information, computational and 
communications technologies within education. 
Froyd el al also established the main considerations for 
engineering courses as: 
1. The establishment of a sound technical base including an 
 
 
Fig. 3. Timeline of Industrial Revolutions.                     Fig. 4. Vehicle system configuration. 
 
 
 
 
understanding that engineering design is not purely about 
technology, but is an interdisciplinary area of study. 
2. Provision of support for individuals in developing 
personal, along with presentational, communication 
skills, including the ability to listen to others. 
3. Support for individuals in developing recording, note 
taking and diagramming skills. 
4. Concept development and the creation of opportunities 
for the cross-fertilisation of ideas and to expose 
individuals to different means of thinking about, and 
solving, problems. 
5. Group working and the development of systems level 
concepts applied across a range of technologies with an 
emphasis on design & innovation. 
6. Encouraging innovative (and hence risky) approaches 
rather than conservative alternatives. 
7. Embedding an understanding of risk and failure within 
innovation and providing the tools to be able to analyse 
failures to establish cause. 
8. Developing an understanding of user aims and goals. 
9. Access to and the sharing of information structured 
around electronic means. 
10. Legislation, as for instance that on privacy, and its 
impact on the design process. 
11. Grading schemes for joint projects involving groups of 
students, perhaps with disparate skills. 
12. Quality mechanisms and their operation. 
A principal role of mechatronic designers at each stage of 
product lifecycle is to make decisions, often involving 
engagement and consultations with experts from other fields. 
In general, decisions are determined by knowledge from 
many sources (and disciplines) involving integration across a 
range of taught and practical courses. Fig. 5 then shows a 
possible structure for a mechatronics course relative to 
product life cycle [34]. 
 
Fig. 5. Mechatronics product development course structure. 
5.1 Risk in the Curriculum 
“The greatest teacher, failure is.” 
Jedi Master Yoda7 
To be effective, the curriculum and its delivery need to 
develop transformational learning to enable students to 
engage in risk taking to create innovative solutions, to 
understand the iterative nature of learning from failure, and to 
accept failure as an integral part of the learning process. 
                                                                  
7  In Star Wars VIII – The Last Jedi 
However, the context of formal education is often driven by 
the need for grades to equate to perceptions of success; high 
grades are then derived from the provision of perceived 
‘correct’ answers.  Within such a learning context, the low 
risk option for students is to practice for assessments, and to 
find out what is deemed to be a correct answer. However, in 
engineering design terms there usually exists the possibility 
for numbers of correct, in that they satisfy the design 
statement of requirements, solutions. The designer must then 
select their preferred solution, which may often be based on 
contextually peripheral but functionally significant 
considerations such as aesthetics. 
Educators can contribute to this risk-averse approach and 
reinforce the conservative nature of learning.  Indeed, it is 
possible to argue that it is not just engineering students who 
are becoming risk averse, but that educators are also seeking 
risk-averse solutions as a practical response to the numerous 
pressures placed upon them to meet set targets in delivering a 
curriculum. The intention within the curriculum and the 
associated course design strategy and process must therefore 
be to ensure that students are rewarded both for innovation 
and risk taking within the design process, and an ability to 
determine causes of failure should they occur. This implies 
discouraging the adoption of overly conservative solutions 
structured around the requirements of whatever grading 
system is in place and instead challenging students to go 
beyond their comfort zone. 
The drivers of curriculum change are graduate employability 
and the skills agenda, teaching–research relationships, 
changing understandings about teaching and learning, 
educational technologies and flexible delivery. The 
curriculum also must acknowledge and cope with the 
learning experience and expectations of entrants while 
covering an increasing diversity of skills and knowledge base 
from national and international curricula where available 
learning technologies and methods of delivery will vary. 
6. CONCLUSIONS 
In their 2004 report The Engineer of 2020: Visions of 
Engineering in the New Century [35] in response to the 
question: 
“What attributes will the engineer of 2020 have?” 
The US National Academy of Engineering suggests that: 
“He or she will aspire to have the ingenuity of Lillian Gilbreth, 
the problem-solving capabilities of Gordon Moore, the scientific 
insight of Albert Einstein, the creativity of Pablo Picasso, the 
determination of the Wright brothers, the leadership abilities of 
Bill Gates, the conscience of Eleanor Roosevelt, the vision of 
Martin Luther King, and the curiosity and wonder of our 
grandchildren.” 
Designing an effective engineering design curriculum that 
expects its graduates to be innovative designers who satisfy 
these criteria requires the course designers and delivery team 
to overcome various challenges encompassing: 
1. The adoption of teaching, learning and assessment 
methods to develop the necessary knowledge and values 
to understanding and experiencing failure and to apply 
this knowledge to future problems. 
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2. The creation of environments within the curriculum in 
students may expect and experience failure to develop 
skills such as persistence, dealing with uncertainty, 
critical thinking, analytical thinking at all stages within a 
multi-disciplinary context. 
3. Provision of all necessary support to facilitate 
communication between individuals engaged in groups 
design activities. This will include the use of technology 
to support the effective transfer of information, and hence 
of knowledge generated. 
4. The implementation of methods of delivery and 
assessment methods that meet the requisite measures for 
success but which include competitive elements and the 
scope for failure.  Working in teams, an essential feature 
of design optimisation, has mixed measures of success for 
teaching, learning and assessment practice. 
5. Designing a curriculum that enables graduates to achieve 
design optimisation and innovation itself requires the 
taking of risk; those delivering and assessing the 
curriculum need to have the academic freedom to design 
and implement and review the solution and then 
reflect/amend as per the process of engineering design to 
achieve the optimum solution. 
6. Quality assessment procedures influence curriculum 
design and delivery and can lead to conservative and less 
effective courses. 
However, if these issues can be managed and accommodated, 
there are opportunities to develop an innovative approach to 
engineering, and specifically mechatronic, design resulting in 
courses that are well suited to meeting the challenges faced 
by Mechatronics in the age of the 4th Industrial Revolution. 
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